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Abstract In December 2001, a Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) came into effect that 
normalized economic relations between the United States and Vietnam. The resulting surge in 
trade surpassed most expectations. The impact of the BTA on FDI, however, has been less 
visible, especially with regard to U.S. FDI into Vietnam. This paper uses new data that accounts 
for FDI by U.S. subsidiaries resident in third counties to show that U.S. firms have been much 
more aggressive investors in Vietnam than normally reported in typical bilateral FDI data using 
Balance of Payments definitions of capital flows. While the U.S. is widely reported as the 11th 
largest investor into Vietnam, the new data shows that U.S.-related FDI exceeded all other 
countries in 2004. Although a formal model is not developed, descriptive data supports strongly 
the conclusion that the BTA has had a major impact on FDI into Vietnam, especially with regard 
to FDI from U.S. multinationals. 
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Introduction and Summary of Key Findings 
 
The United States and Vietnam normalized economics relations with the coming into 
effect of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) on December 10, 2001.2  The BTA 
is a comprehensive trade agreement based in large part on WTO Agreements, with extensive 
obligations regarding trade in goods and services, the protection of intellectual property rights 
(IPR), the development of investment, business facilitation, and transparency and the right to 
appeal.3 On the day that the BTA came into effect, the U.S. extended normal trade relations 
(NTR) status to Vietnam.4  This reduced tariff levels for imports from Vietnam into the United 
States from an average of around 40 percent to an average of around 4 percent, effectively 
removing prohibitively high tariff rates in most sectors and opening up the U.S. market for 
Vietnamese exporters. Although many in Vietnam were pessimistic about the ability of 
Vietnamese firms to compete in the U.S. market, the response was striking. Vietnamese exports 
grew five-fold from 2001 to the end of 2004, just three years after the BTA came into effect.5    
Vietnam was required to meet the same extensive BTA obligations as the United States. 
As a transition economy not yet in the WTO, this required major changes in laws, regulations 
and administrative procedures, as well as improving market access for goods and particularly 
services for U.S. firms. The BTA, as a bilateral (not a free) trade agreement, required that 
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Vietnam reduce tariff levels on an MFN basis only on around 250 products, primarily in the 
agricultural sector.6 The BTA does, however, have strong requirements to improve the business 
environment for U.S. firms in Vietnam in general, including extensive obligations to improve the 
foreign investment climate for U.S. firms in Vietnam, particularly in service sectors. 
Recognizing Vietnam’s developing country status and the role of the BTA as a “stepping stone” 
to WTO accession, Vietnam was allowed to phase in a number of important commitments over 
periods from two to ten years, particularly those related to market access for goods and services, 
investment performance, customs procedures and IPR protection.   Nevertheless, U.S. exports to 
Vietnam doubled over the first three years of BTA implementation, in large part as a result of a 
major purchase of Boeing 777 aircraft by Vietnam Airlines, which was concluded just after the 
BTA came into force.  
While the bilateral trade response to the BTA exceeded the expectations of many, the 
response of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the BTA, particularly U.S. FDI, was less 
apparent.7 Normally “reported” registered FDI flows from all countries using standard Balance 
of Payments definitions grew from US$2.6 billion in 2000 to US$4.2 billion in 2004, a solid 61 
percent increase (see Figure 1). Reported implemented FDI, however, grew by just 18 percent 
over this period, coming to US$2.85 billion in 2004. Normally reported U.S. FDI data provide an 
even less conclusive picture. Reported U.S. registered FDI almost doubled from 2000 to 2002, 
but then fell substantially in 2003 and 2004 to just US$47 million. On the other hand, reported 
U.S. implemented FDI grew from US$62 million to US$162 million from 2000 to 2004, with 
strong increases in 2003 and 2004.8 In addition to the relatively erratic growth path following the 
implementation of the BTA, the levels of reported U.S. FDI  remained quite small relative to 
overall FDI inflows. As commonly reported in Vietnamese publications, U.S. FDI levels 
accumulated from 1988 to 2004 ranked the U.S. as the 11th largest investor in Vietnam, 
obviously much smaller than would be expected from the largest economy in the world.9    
This article uses new data developed by Vietnam’s Foreign Investment Agency (FIA) in 
the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) to review more carefully how FDI responded to 
the BTA. The new data present a much clearer and more positive picture of how FDI responded 
to the BTA, particularly with regard to U.S. FDI. “U.S.-related” FDI is calculated by adding FDI 
from U.S. overseas subsidiaries resident in third countries (like Singapore) to FDI sourced 
directly from U.S.-based firms. U.S.-related FDI grew dramatically in 2003 and 2004, surpassing 
FDI levels over this period from Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, traditionally the countries 
considered to be the largest investors into Vietnam.10 The new data provide a more robust 
empirical representation of how U.S. multinational firms manage their FDI into Vietnam. It 
shows clearly the problem with using typical bilateral Balance of Payments measures of FDI to 
analyze how multinational firms adjust their FDI decisions in response to major policy changes, 
especially in developing countries and especially for U.S.-based multinationals operating under 
U.S. tax laws.  Based on this new data, it becomes clear that U.S. firms responded substantially 
more strongly than previously reported to the reforms induced by the BTA. Without the 
expansion of U.S-related investment from 2000 to 2004, in fact, overall implemented FDI into 
Vietnam over that period would have grown by just 4 percent instead of the 18 percent actually 
recorded.   
Two additional findings of note are reported. FDI to Vietnam by U.S. firms has been 
much higher than commonly reported for many years, with the new data showing that U.S.-
related FDI accumulated from 1988 to 2004 is around three and one-half times higher than 
normally “reported” bilateral U.S. FDI. This is in line with the “visual” evidence of the existence 
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of many U.S. firms operating in Vietnam. As well, not only has U.S.-related FDI responded 
strongly to the BTA, there is also evidence that FDI from East Asian economies expanded 
substantially from 2000 to 2004 in those sectors where exports increased the most with the 
opening up of the U.S. market – that is apparel, footwear and furniture. This further reinforces 
the conclusion that the BTA has had a major positive impact on FDI flows into Vietnam.   
 
 
The U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement and Its Effects on the Environment for FDI 
To Vietnam 
 
Investment Commitments under the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Agreement. The BTA is the 
most comprehensive trade agreement ever entered into by Vietnam. Investment is a key part of 
the BTA. The scope of investment covered by the BTA is not limited to direct investment but 
also includes indirect investment, including equity, bonds and other tangible and intangible 
assets. As an Agreement modeled on a WTO framework, the BTA includes all WTO 
commitments related to investment, including: 
  
- Eliminating trade-related investment measures (WTO-TRIMs); 
- Opening up goods and particularly service sectors for foreign investment under a 
schedule;11  
- Non-discrimination and elimination of dual price systems; and  
- Transparency in the promulgation and implementation of investment policies. 
 
As well, the BTA contains other provisions that go beyond the WTO Agreements related 
to investment and that are similar to those in typical investment protection agreements, such as 
the Vietnam-Japan Agreement on the Protection and Encouragement of Investment that was 
concluded two years after the BTA. Important commitments in the BTA that are not covered in 
the WTO include: 
 
- Eliminating export performance requirements (which are not covered by TRIMs); 
- Allowing licensing by registration for those foreign-invested projects not specified as  
sensitive sectors; 
- Removal of restrictions on: i) equity participation; ii) the consensus principle for 
corporate governance in joint ventures; and, iii) some other limitations on the 
establishment and management of U.S.-invested enterprises;  
- Allowing U.S. investors to set up joint stock companies and to issue securities in 
Vietnam; and,  
- Provision of improved investment protection procedures and dispute settlement 
mechanisms between investors and the State, including access to international arbitration 
under the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID). 
 
Some of the investment commitments in the BTA mentioned above were required to be 
applied over the first three years of BTA implementation, while a number of others are to be 
phased in over subsequent years.  
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A Review of How BTA Investment Commitments Have Been Implemented. Vietnam has 
implemented a number of important commitments in the BTA, and is scheduled to revise 
thoroughly by the end of 2005 its overall legal framework for investment and enterprise 
registration by developing a new Common Investment Law (CIL) and a new Unified Enterprise 
Law (UEL).12 The CIL and UEL are expected to harmonize foreign and domestic investment and 
enterprise registration regimes, and are expected to liberalize access by foreign investors to a 
number of sectors, particularly service sectors. The exact market access reforms will be 
determined by the final resolution of the WTO accession negotiations, and will be applied on an 
MFN basis to all WTO members. The following is a brief review of the progress that has been 
made on implementing investment commitments in the BTA: 
 
- National Treatment (NT) and Most Favored Nation (MFN): The Ordinance on MFN and 
NT provides a general legal framework for extending NT and MFN to foreign investors and 
traders.  The CIL and UEL are expected to deal specifically with key NT issues related to 
investment.   
- Removal of Dual Pricing: As of January 1, 2005, with adjustments for electricity, Vietnam 
completed its obligation to remove all dual pricing for services provided to foreign 
businesses.13  
- Removal of the Limitation on Technology Transfer: Decree 27/2003/NĐ-CP removed the 
requirement that foreign contribution in the form of technology must be less than 20 percent 
of equity.  
- Mortgage of Land Use Rights: The Foreign Investment Law and the new Land Law allow 
foreign investors to mortgage land use rights at credit institutions licensed to operate in 
Vietnam.  
- Eliminating TRIMs: 
? The foreign-exchange-balancing requirement has been abolished under the Foreign 
Investment Law and Decision 46/2003/QĐ-TTg, which states that enterprises do not 
have to sell foreign exchange to banks by reducing the foreign exchange forced 
surrender rate to zero percent; 
? Vietnam does not apply import and export balancing requirements; 
? The Foreign Investment Law encourages but does not force companies to buy 
domestic products per local content requirements. However, in some sectors, taxes 
and various incentives may be based on how much local content is used in the 
production of a product; and,  
? Decree 27/2003/NĐ-CP removed the requirement that a certain level of exports is 
required to maintain a foreign investment license in some domestic industries, but 
other remains. 
- Market Access Commitments: Recently, licensing authorities state that they have been 
applying the BTA to U.S. investors on a case-by-case basis.   In a number of sectors, 
however, these rights for U.S. investors are not yet clearly provided for in written regulations 
published in the Official Gazette, as is required by the BTA.  
- Investment Dispute Resolution Commitment: MPI has submitted to the Prime Minister a 
proposal to accede to the Washington Convention 1965 Resolution on disputes between a 
state and citizen of another country. MPI is working with other agencies to complete 
necessary legal procedures for submitting this Resolution to the President for final approval.  
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The Common Investment Law and the Uniform Enterprise Law are expected to meet a 
number of additional BTA commitments, including: 
 
- Extension of licensing by registration to all sectors, except those with restrictions in the 
BTA/WTO; 
- Liberalizing access by foreign investors in sectors per international commitments, 
including those scheduled under the BTA and the WTO accession protocol; 
- Removal of restrictions on foreign investment, such as the minimum capital requirement, 
limits on the establishment of joint-stock companies, consensus decision making 
requirements, and the first refusal right to Vietnamese joint-venture partners; and, 
- Full elimination of investment performance requirements in line with the TRIMs 
Agreement, which is essentially incorporated by reference in the BTA, and for export 
performance requirements as required by the BTA. 
 
In addition to commitments directly affecting investment, Vietnam has made significant 
progress toward implementing other commitments in the BTA that help improve the business 
environment for both domestic and foreign firms. These include improving transparency by 
requiring publication of regulations before their effectiveness, reforming court procedures to 
make the courts more independent and effective, improving the arbitration process, modernizing 
contract law, reforming legal and banking service sectors, and implementing customs valuation 
based on transaction value. Although major improvements are being made in the business 
environment for FDI in Vietnam, important constraints remain.14 
 
The Expected Impact of the BTA on Overall and U.S. FDI in Vietnam. When analyzing the 
impact of the BTA on FDI, it is important to take into account the relative competitive 
advantages of firms in Vietnam, the United States and third countries. The competitive 
advantage of U.S. companies typically focus on more capital/skill/technology-intensive sectors, 
such as financial, legal, telecommunications and distribution services, information technology 
and chemical manufacturers, and oil and gas and other capital-intensive, natural-resource-based 
production. U.S. firms are typically strong in sectors where intellectual property is important. 
Vietnam’s comparative advantage for exports, on the other hand, tends toward labor-intensive 
sectors such as clothing, furniture and footwear, and natural-resource-intensive sectors such as 
tropical agricultural production, oil and gas, and mining. While U.S. buyers have an aggressive 
presence in Vietnam, it is relatively rare for U.S. firms to invest in labor-intensive export 
production.15 For these sectors, FDI from Vietnam’s East Asian neighbors is much more typical. 
As such, this analysis would predict that the opening of the U.S. market for labor-intensive 
exports from Vietnam would increase FDI primarily from regional Asian investors rather than 
from the United States. Over time, however, Vietnamese exports should diversify into sectors 
where U.S. firms have stronger competitive advantages, and thus it should be expected that 
export-related U.S. FDI should expand over time.  
 
Firms also will invest in Vietnam because of opportunities to export to countries other 
than the United States.  To the degree that the BTA improves the business environment in 
Vietnam, such FDI should increase as well. Probably most importantly, however, opportunities 
in the domestic economy are increasingly attractive for foreign investors. In this regard, the BTA 
represents one part of a much broader effort by the Vietnamese government to develop its 
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economy and to improve its business environment. Vietnam’s economy has grown by an annual 
average of around 7 percent over the last decade, is beginning to industrialize quickly, and has a 
relatively well-educated population of around 82 million with relatively broad-based increases in 
standards of living and steady declines in poverty levels. These strong economic fundamentals, 
combined with widely perceived political stability, create demand for FDI into Vietnam for 
building all types of physical and social infrastructure, for building industry and developing 
services to meet  rising consumer demand and to support the industrialization process, and for 
extracting major reserves of natural resources, especially oil and gas.  
 
 
Overall FDI Flows into Vietnam and the Impact of the BTA 
 
As shown in Figure 1, after the spike in the mid-1990s, FDI into Vietnam increased 
moderately from 1999 to 2004. Although growth in registered FDI picked up a bit from 2001 to 
2004 as the BTA was being approved and implemented, most likely representing some increased 
interest in overall FDI related to the BTA, FDI actually implemented has grown quite modestly 
since 1997. Furthermore, many other reforms not directly related to the BTA have been enacted 
from 2000 to 2004, making it difficult to discern the direct impact of the BTA on FDI.  
FDI into Vietnam depends not only on Vietnamese policies, but also on the policies of 
other countries competing for similar FDI and on factors affecting foreign investors, both of 
which are beyond the control of Vietnam. Table 1 shows that global and regional FDI flows have 
experienced a sharp decline since 2000. Despite the vibrant economies in Southeast Asia and 
China, FDI inflows into East and Southeast Asia dropped by more than a third from US$143 
billion in 2000 to US$97 billion in 2003.  The global FDI picture was even bleaker, with a sharp 
decline by more than one-half, from US$1,388 billion in 2000 to US$560 billion in 2003.16 
Furthermore, FDI to China continued to grow solidly in this period, partly as a result of China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001, increasing from US$41 billion in 2000 to US$53 billion in 2003. 
This increase in FDI to China means that FDI to other Southeast and East Asian economies fell 
even more severely than the regional numbers would imply. If we assess Vietnam’s FDI 
performance against this background, Vietnam actually fared well in relative terms compared to 
most of its regional neighbors. Other than China, Vietnam was one of the few countries in the 
world where FDI increased from 2000 to 2003. This suggests that Vietnam’s reforms appear to 
have had a more positive impact on FDI than is commonly perceived when country-level results 
are reviewed in isolation. On the other hand, Vietnam did not keep up with China’s path-
breaking success in attracting FDI over this period.  
An interesting feature of FDI into Vietnam since the mid-1990s peak is that the number 
of registered FDI projects has increased while the average size of a FDI project has declined (see 
Figure 2).17  From 1996 to 2002, FDI into Vietnam was made increasingly in the form of smaller 
projects, rather than the larger projects registered in the mid-1990s. This trend changes after the 
coming into force of the BTA, with the average size of new registered projects increasing in size 
somewhat after 2001. From 2002 to 2004, nevertheless, the average FDI project represented a 
relatively small capital investment and was made increasingly in light manufacturing industries 
(as reported by the FIA).  This feature is not necessarily good or bad. For a country with a 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive exports, one would expect smaller capital investments. 
On the other hand, this trend clearly shows that there has not been many large, new FDI projects 
in infrastructure and heavier industry.   
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In order to explore more directly the implications of the BTA on FDI, we examine FDI 
flows in clothing, furniture and fisheries, three sectors that have experienced strong export 
growth to the U.S. since the entry into force of the BTA. As shown in Table 2, registered FDI in 
these three sectors clearly started to pick up in 2000, the year that the BTA was signed, and have 
continued to post solid results over the last four years.18 According to the FIA and company 
interviews, many of these projects were aimed at exporting to the United States and originated 
from other East Asian countries. Ninety-three percent of FDI in the clothing sector from 2000 to 
2004, for example, originated from investors in Asia, mostly from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea 
and Singapore.  Reported U.S. FDI accounted for only 1 percent of total FDI in the apparel 
sector.  
The important contribution of FDI into these three sectors targeted toward export 
opportunities to the U.S. opened up by the BTA was substantial during this period.19 As shown 
in Table 2, the share of the three sectors in total registered capital increased from a mere 3 
percent in 1998 to 25 percent in 2001, and then leveled off to around 16 percent in 2003 and 
2004. In absolute terms, registered FDI in these sectors increased from around US$130 million in 
1998 and 1999 to a peak of US$804 million in 2001.  FDI in these sectors remained strong from 
2002 to 2004, reaching US$670 million in 2004. Clearly, without the major expansion of FDI in 
these BTA-related-export sectors, Vietnam’s overall FDI performance would have been 
substantially weaker over the last five years. 
FDI in clothing appears to have been affected by the imposition of quotas by the U.S. on  
Vietnamese-based clothing exporters in 2003, as represented by a slight decrease in FDI in 
2003.20 However, FDI in clothing rebounded quickly in 2004.  According to interviews with 
garment companies, three reasons were given to explain the strong expansion of FDI in the 
clothing sector in 2004. First, clothing producers expect to take advantage of the elimination of 
the U.S. quota when Vietnam accedes to WTO, which they apparently expect to happen in the 
near future. In this regard, they are investing their funds because they expect that Vietnam will 
be able to compete effectively with China and others in the global clothing market. Second, some 
companies have been able to expand the export of quota-free items to the United States. And, 
third, the elimination of the EU quota on Vietnamese clothing exports opened up new market 
opportunities. With the positive attitude by foreign investors that Vietnam can compete in an 
unregulated global market for apparel, reinforced by recent policies to limit imports of apparel 
products from China into the U.S. and EU markets, it is expected that FDI in the Vietnamese 
clothing sector will remain strong, especially if Vietnam accedes to the WTO by the end of 2005 
as currently targeted and can then benefit from the elimination of U.S. textile quotas.   
In line with the registered data, implemented FDI in the clothing sector recorded a solid, 
steady increase from US$84 million in 1998 to US$204 million in 2004 (see Table 3). Growth 
picked up somewhat from 2001 to 2004, the years of BTA implementation. Comparing 1998 to 
2004, the share of FDI in clothing to total implemented FDI doubled from 3.5 percent to 7.2 
percent. Although this Report focuses on FDI, the opening of the U.S. market and BTA-related 
improvements in the business and investment environment almost surely have also stimulated 
domestic investment, including in the clothing sector where a number of Vietnamese firms (often 
state-owned firms) expanded capacity quickly to meet the surge in demand for exports of 





     Parker, Quang and Anh, International Journal of Applied Economics, 2(2), September 2002, 199-223 206
U.S. FDI into Vietnam and the Impact of the BTA 
 
“Reported” U.S. FDI to Vietnam. According to the official statistics normally reported by 
MPI, from 1988 through December 31, 2004, “reported” registered U.S. FDI into Vietnam 
amounted to US$1.3 billion, of which US$730 million had been implemented in 215 projects in 
manufacturing, oil and gas, agriculture and services sectors (see Table 3). The U.S. ranked 11th 
among 75 investing countries into Vietnam at the end of 2004.21 
As shown in Figure 3, reported registered U.S. FDI to Vietnam has trended steadily 
downward since the “boom” period in the mid-1990s. After a bump up in 2001 and 2002 during 
the period when the BTA was coming into effect, registered U.S. FDI actually fell substantially 
in 2003 and 2004, even as a number of BTA commitments were set to be phased in.  This data 
would clearly lead to the presumption that the BTA has not had a major effect on U.S. FDI to 
Vietnam. Implemented U.S. FDI data, however, presents a more positive result, growing solidly 
in 2003 and 2004.  Even with this growth, however, reported implemented U.S. FDI remained 
much smaller than FDI from many other countries after the BTA (see Figure 3 and Table 6).   
 
U.S.-Related FDI to Vietnam. In order to assess the full response of U.S. investors to the BTA, 
it is necessary to consider not only FDI sourced directly from the U.S., but also to examine FDI 
made by U.S. overseas subsidiaries resident in third countries. For a number of reasons, we 
expect that U.S. firms will invest in Vietnam strongly through their overseas subsidiaries, 
especially their Asian regional headquarters. First, the BTA covers not only investment sourced 
in the U.S., but it also covers on an equal basis investment made by U.S. subsidiaries resident in 
third countries. Second, and quite importantly, based on interviews with a number of U.S. firms 
operating in Vietnam, many noted that U.S. tax laws encourage U.S. firms to source their 
investment from overseas subsidiaries. Third, there can be managerial and other business 
operation benefits to having an investment in Vietnam managed by a close-by regional 
headquarters, especially since most U.S.-related FDI projects in Vietnam tend to be relatively 
small. MPI reports that a number of prominent U.S. firms operating in Vietnam have sourced 
their FDI from third countries.22 For example, American Home, Coca Cola, Proctor and Gamble, 
Caltex and American Standards are invested out of Singapore; Baker & McKenzie and 
Exxonmobil are sourced from U.S. subsidiaries in Hong Kong; Conoco is invested from the 
United Kingdom; and Pepsi, British American Tobacco, KPMG and Cisco are investments by 
U.S. subsidiaries in Holland. A large oil and gas investment by a U.S. firm originated from  
Mauritius. As a result, to assess carefully the response of U.S. firms to the impact of the BTA, it 
is necessary to analyze data that reports on FDI from overseas U.S. subsidiaries as well as FDI 
sourced directly from the United States.  
To facilitate this research, based on reports from all major provinces in Vietnam, the FIA 
reviewed as many foreign-invested project reports as possible to determine whether the FDI was 
sourced directly from a U.S.-based firm or from a U.S. overseas subsidiary registered in a third 
country.  A new type of FDI data has been calculated by MPI to capture more fully how U.S. 
multinationals manage their FDI decisions in Vietnam – “U.S.-related” FDI.  U.S.-related FDI 
equals FDI reported as sourced from the U.S.-based firms (the typical FDI reported by MPI) plus 
FDI from overseas U.S. subsidiaries sourced from third countries. Given the limitations of this 
study, it is not possible to make similar adjustments to FDI from other countries. As a result, this 
Report cannot re-rank U.S.-related FDI relative to other countries “related” FDI.   
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In comparison to reported U.S.-based FDI, U.S.-related FDI provides a considerably 
different, and much more positive, picture regarding how U.S. investors have contributed to 
Vietnam’s economy over the last seventeen years and have responded to the BTA over the last 
three years (see Figure 4 and Table 4). Looking first at cumulative FDI as most commonly 
reported by MPI, U.S.-related initial registered FDI from 1988 through 2004 was US$2.602 
billion compared to the reported initial registered U.S. FDI of US$1.291 billion. The difference 
is even more profound for implemented FDI, with U.S.-related implemented FDI equaling 
$2.634 billion compared to reported implemented U.S. FDI of US$730 million. For the 
cumulative data, U.S.-related registered FDI is more than double the stock of reported registered 
U.S. FDI, and U.S.-related implemented FDI is more than three and a half times the stock of 
reported implemented U.S. FDI. Interestingly, as shown in Table 5, levels of U.S.-related FDI 
were considerable from 1996 through 2001, before the BTA and during a time when overall FDI 
to Vietnam was relatively weak. Clearly, the new data on U.S.-related FDI confirm that U.S. 
firms have been much more strongly invested in the Vietnamese economy over the last ten to 
fifteen years than the normal reported FDI has led one to believe.  
U.S.-related investment increased significantly after the entry into force of the BTA, 
especially in the years 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 4 and Table 5). Over the pre-BTA period, from 
1996 to 2001, the average growth of U.S-related implemented FDI was minimal, just around 3 
percent per year. From 2001 to 2004, however, U.S.-related implemented FDI surged by an 
average of 27 percent per year. U.S.-related FDI was particularly strong in 2003 and 2004, 
achieving levels around two times higher than normal years in the past. Furthermore, U.S.-
related implemented FDI from 2002 to 2004 totaled to US$1.149 billion, while regular reported 
implemented U.S. FDI came to just US$355 million. In this regard, U.S.-related FDI was around 
three times higher than the regular reported U.S. FDI since the BTA came into effect. 
Furthermore, during this difficult global period for FDI (see Table 1), overall implemented FDI 
to Vietnam would have increased by just 4 percent from 2000 to 2004 without the robust 
expansion in U.S.-related FDI compared to the actual 18 percent growth achieved over this 
period.  Clearly, U.S. investors have responded quite positively to the coming into force of the 
BTA, and the regular reported FDI data have strongly under-reported how U.S. firms have 
responded to the BTA.  
Lastly, U.S.-related FDI to Vietnam has grown more strongly since the BTA than has 
non-U.S. FDI (see Figure 5 and Table 6). In 2003, U.S.-related FDI surged to the second largest 
level among all countries, just below Japan. In 2004, U.S-related FDI exceeded all other 
countries.  This result, in fact, qualifies the argument that the initial investment response to the 
BTA may be dominated by East Asian firms investing in Vietnam to export labor-intensive 
products to the newly opened U.S. market.  Although it appears that East Asian FDI did increase 
in some key sectors related to exporting to the U.S. market (as noted above for clothing, furniture 
and fisheries), U.S.-related FDI also increased markedly as the BTA came into force and was 
implemented in large part successfully over time.    
Around three-quarters of FDI originating from overseas U.S. subsidiaries has come from 
Singapore and one big oil and gas project from Mauritius (made before the BTA). Other 
countries serving as important bases for FDI from U.S.-subsidiaries include Holland, Hong 
Kong, British Virgin Islands and Bermuda (see Table 7). Since these data are available only on 
an accumulated basis from 1988 to 2004, it is not possible to determine from which resident third 
countries the substantial increase in FDI from overseas U.S. subsidiaries in 2003 and 2004 was 
sourced from. Based on lists of firms provided by the FIA, however, it appears that a substantial 
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proportion of such FDI was sourced from Singapore, and it is clear that it was not sourced from 
Japan, Taiwan or Korea.  
Table 4 breaks down U.S.-related and reported U.S. FDI by economic sector. Cumulated 
from 1988 through 2004, U.S.-related implemented FDI totaled US$2.633 billion, consisting of 
267 projects employing 16,853 people by the end of 2004.  In fact, 72 percent of U.S.-related 
implemented investment worth US$1.9 billion was from overseas subsidiaries of U.S. 
companies, while only 28 percent has been funded directly from the United States. The majority 
of U.S.-related FDI is in heavy industry, food processing and oil and gas, which have accounted 
for 74 percent of accumulated U.S.-related implemented FDI.23 The most common type of FDI 
has been in the form of 100-percent foreign ownership (72 percent of the number of U.S.-related 
projects), but this has accounted for only 42 percent of total U.S.-related implemented FDI.  Joint 
ventures and business cooperation contracts (BCCs) accounted for 25 percent and 33 percent of 
total implemented U.S.-related FDI, respectively. The high percentage of U.S. FDI in the form of 
BCCs is due to several large projects in the oil and gas sector, which by regulation can only take 
the form of BCCs. Most U.S.-related investment is located in Ho Chi Minh City and Binh 
Duong, Dong Nai and Vung Tau provinces in the South, Ha Noi and the province of Hai Duong 
in the North, and in unspecified locations for oil and gas.24
 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
This is the first study made on the impact of the BTA on FDI into Vietnam. New data 
collected by Vietnam’s Ministry of Planning and Invesment show clearly that the BTA has had a 
significant, positive impact on overall FDI, and particularly U.S.-related FDI, into Vietnam. 
These findings are based on descriptive analysis – no attempt is made to develop a more 
sophisticated economic model that could more carefully isolate the impact of the BTA relative to 
other factors affecting FDI into Vietnam. Another finding demanding more in-depth research is 
how the BTA affected domestic investment and private sector development. We hope that these 
descriptive results stimulate new questions and further research on FDI flows into Vietnam, and 
that it can serve as a benchmark for assessing the impact on FDI of Vietnam’s pending WTO 
accession. To facilitate further research, the authors would be happy to provide more details on 





1. Steve Parker and Phan Vinh Quang are Director and Deputy Director of the USAID-funded 
STAR-Vietnam Project, respectively. The STAR Project supports the State of Vietnam to 
implement the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement and to accede to the World Trade 
Organization. Nguyen Ngoc Anh is a Lecturer of Economics at the Hanoi Business School 
and Senior Expert at the American Department of Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade. This article 
does not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
the STAR-Vietnam Project, or the Government of Vietnam.  
 
2. This article draws heavily from a preliminary July 2005 Report prepared by Vietnam’s 
Foreign Investment Agency in the Ministry of Planning and Investment and the STAR-
Vietnam Project on “The Impact of the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement on Overall 
and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment in Vietnam (MPI/STAR Report)”. The final report is 
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expected to be published by the end of September, 2005. This and the other reports 
referenced from STAR are available on the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s 
“Vietnam Business Forum” webpage: http://www.vibonline.com.vn/. 
 
3. The BTA is provided in full on the U.S. Trade Representative Website and is printed in 
Vietnam’s Official Gazette. 
 
4. NTR is equivalent to the more commonly used term Most Favored Nations (MFN) 
Treatment, which means that one country agrees to treat equally all other countries with 
NTR/MFN status.  As a founding WTO member, with the extension of NTR/MFN treatment 
to Vietnam, the U.S. immediately complied with the obligations of the BTA. 
 
5. For a more detailed description of the BTA and its initial implementation, its link to the 
WTO, and the subsequent bilateral trade response to the coming into effect of the BTA, see 
the 2002 Annual Report on “An Assessment of the Economic Impact of the U.S.-Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement,” and the “Update on Bilateral Trade in 2003 Between Vietnam 
and the United States,” both produced by the Vietnamese Central Institute of Economic 
Management (CIEM) and STAR.   
 
6. To be clear, the BTA is a “bilateral-trade” agreement that normalized trade relations between 
the two countries, it is not a “free-trade” agreement. Extensive reductions in Vietnam’s tariff 
levels are expected to be made on a MFN basis as a result of Vietnam’s WTO accession 
negotiations, for which the Vietnamese Government has set a self-imposed deadline for 
accession by the end of 2005.   
7. The MPI/STAR Report examines FDI only. It does not include other forms of foreign 
investment, such as portfolio investment in capital markets, and does not assess what should 
be the important impact of the BTA on domestic investment. In this regard, FDI would 
include such investment by overseas Vietnamese under the Foreign Investment Law but 
would exclude investment made by overseas Vietnamese that may be registered as domestic 
investment under the Domestic Investment Encouragement Law. 
 
8. As is typical for most reporting on FDI throughout the world, MPI reports FDI based on 
standard Balance of Payments definitions, which designates the origin of FDI as the country 
where the funding of the investment originates. This importantly and accurately measures 
capital flows from one country to another, but, as noted, it does not adequately capture how 
many U.S. multinational companies manage their investment decisions.  
 
9. See the weekly magazine “Vietnam Investment Review” published by the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment. 
 
10. MPI was not able to determine FDI originating from non-U.S. overseas subsidiaries. As a 
result, it is not possible to do a re-ranking of “related” FDI for all countries. 
   
11. The WTO accession agreement will most likely require a greater number of service sectors to 
be opened in a shorter time period than did the BTA commitments.  
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12. In recognition of the importance of the BTA to international integration and improving the 
business environment, the National Assembly of Vietnam issued Resolution No. 
48/2001/QH10 dated November 28, 2001 instructing various government agencies to amend 
laws and regulations to implement the BTA. 
 
13. Note that this applies only to foreign businesses. Foreign individuals still pay a higher price 
for electricity. Dual prices for other fees had been removed earlier, including for: water, 
phone installation, air transportation and advertising.  
 
14. Results from a survey of 81 foreign firms conducted for the full MPI/STAR Report show that 
the BTA tended to have a positive effect on their investment decisions. This tendency was 
strongest for U.S. firms and for firms exporting to the United States.  Regarding which parts 
of the BTA most importantly influence investment decisions, firms stressed the importance 
of improving transparency, removing discrimination between domestic and foreign firms, 
streamlining the investment licensing system, opening more sectors to FDI and improving 
IPR enforcement. U.S. firms stressed more than non-U.S. foreign firms the importance of 
removing discrimination, opening more sectors to FDI, improving IPR protection and 
improving dispute resolution. When all general considerations for improving the business 
and investment environment were taken into account, not just those emphasized by the BTA, 
the firms stressed the importance of enforcing laws evenly and effectively, of joining the 
WTO and of improving the tax and investment licensing systems. U.S. firms compared to 
non-U.S. foreign firms stressed the importance of agreements on tax, trade and investment. 
Although firms responding to the survey noted that the investment environment in Vietnam 
had clearly improved recently, importantly in part as a result of the BTA, they clearly stress 
the importance of continuing to develop a more transparent legal system with more effective, 
uniform and predictable enforcement of laws and policies. For additional perspectives by 
businesses in Vietnam, see the Vietnam Business Forum webpage: 
“www.vietnambusinessforum.org”. 
 
15. The case of NIKE’s role in Vietnam is a good example of this situation. NIKE is one of, if 
not, the largest purchaser of Vietnamese products, but it actually does not own any factories 
in Vietnam. All NIKE products are produced on a contract basis. In 2001, NIKE purchased 
US$450 million exports from Vietnam produced by 6 foreign-invested shoe makers and 20 
garment factories. By 2004, NIKE had increased exports from Vietnam to US$728 million 
purchased from 9 foreign-invested shoe makers and 30 garment factories. These firms in 
combination employed about 130,000 people in Vietnam. Vietnam is the second largest 
manufacturing base for NIKE athletic shoes, accounting for 22 percent of NIKE’s total 
global volume. Clearly, NIKE has expanded strongly its purchases of goods from Vietnam 
since the coming into effect of the BTA. Also clearly, in this case, the BTA has stimulated 
greater FDI into Vietnam from regional investors such as Taiwan and Korea to produce 
products for NIKE, and has stimulated domestic investment in factories that enter into 
contract manufacturing relationships with the NIKE buyers (see the Vietnam Economic 
Times, May 18, 2005 and a column from the Dow Jones Newswire). 
 
16. See the UNCTAD FDI database (www.unctad.org). 
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17. Registered new capital is used to examine new FDI projects, because implemented 
investment in a certain year can represent the cumulative impact of the implementation of a 
registered investment over time.   
 
18. The technical negotiations for the BTA were concluded in 1999 and the BTA was signed by 
the two governments on July 13, 2000. It was passed by the U.S. Congress on October 3, 
2001 and signed by the U.S. President on October 16, 2001. It was ratified by the Vietnamese 
National Assembly on November 28, 2001 and signed by the President of Vietnam on 
December 7, 2001. The BTA came into force on December 10, 2001. 
 
19. Clothing exports to the U.S. grew from US$48 million in 2001 to US$2.6 billion in 2004 
despite the introduction of the textile quota. Fisheries exports to the U.S. rose from US$512 
million in 2001 to US$732 million in 2003 and then declined to US$568 million in 2004 as a 
result of anti-dumping cases for catfish and shrimp. Furniture exports to the U.S. increased 
from US$13 million in 2001 to US$386 million in 2004. In this regard, Vietnam benefited 
from a U.S. anti-dumping suit against Chinese furniture producers. For a more 
comprehensive review of trade flows between Vietnam and the U.S., please refer to the 
Economic Reports of  STAR-Vietnam posted on www.vibonline.com.vn.  
 
20. The full text of the “Agreement Relating to Trade in Cotton, Wool, Man-Made Fiber, Non-
Cotton Vegetable Fiber and Silk Blend Textiles and Textile Products between the 
Governments of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam” is 
available on the Department of Commerce website: “otexa.ita.doc.gov/#IMPORTQUOTAS”. 
The agreement was signed on July 17, 2003, and applied retroactively to May 1, 2003. The 
agreement set quantitative limits (not value limits) on exports of certain textile and apparel 
items, which altogether accounted for about 90 percent of textiles and apparel exported by 
Vietnam to the U.S. in early 2003. The working assumption in the agreement was that the 
export value allowed by quota in the base year of 2003 was approximately US$1.7 billion. 
The agreement allowed for the quotas to be automatically extended to 2004 and beyond. It 
allows Vietnam in each year to “Swing” quota limits from one (not fully used) category into 
another (fully used) category by up to 6 percent, as long as a corresponding reduction is 
made. It also allows exporters each year to redistribute quota not used up in one category to a 
category that is full, and to “carryover” unused quota for a product from one year to the next, 
not to exceed 11 percent. The 2003 quotas could grow in 2004 and subsequent years by 7 
percent for non-wool products and 2 percent for wool products. While the U.S. eliminated 
textile quotas for all WTO members in line with the Uruguay Round commitment to phase 
out fully the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing by January 1, 2005, the U.S. is 
maintaining its quota on Vietnamese apparel imports until Vietnam accedes to the WTO. 
 
21. See the weekly magazine “Vietnam Investment Review” published by the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment. 
 
22. Many other FDI projects by major U.S. firms, of course, have been sourced directly from the 
United States. For example, major investments by Ford, Citibank, Kimberly Clark, Cargill, 
Colgate and Unocal are sourced from the United States. Although considerably more 
numerous in terms of the number of projects than those sourced from overseas subsidiaries, 
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FDI sourced directly from the U.S. tend to be smaller in value terms and are reported by the 
FIA to have a higher rate of failure than those sourced from overseas U.S. subsidiaries 
resident in third countries.  
 
23. Data are currently not available to provide a more detailed sectoral breakdown of the heavy 
industry aggregate.  Major FDI by Coca-Cola and Pepsi overseas subsidiaries are included in 
the food processing sector. 
 
24. For detailed FDI data by province, see the forthcoming MPI/STAR Report on “The Impact of 
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FIGURES AND TABLES:   
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Table 1:  FDI Inflows by Region (US$ billions) 
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Figure 2:  The Number and Average Size of New Registered FDI Projects in Vietnam 
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Table 2:  Share of Registered FDI in Clothing, Furniture and Fisheries to Overall 
Registered FDI from 1998 to 2004 (US$ millions) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Clothing 60 54 122 657 349 337 420
Furniture 52 68 80 108 108 96 232
Fisheries 15 9 16 39 37 52 18
Total registered FDI of 
three sectors 
127 131 218 804 494 485 670
Total registered FDI 4,781 2,197 2,485 3,224 2,757 3,064 4,200
Share of three sectors in 
overall registered FDI 
3% 6% 9% 25% 18% 16% 16%
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Table 3: Implemented FDI in Clothing Compared to Total Implemented FDI from 1998 to 
2004 (US$ millions) 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Clothing 84 97 102 141 198  176 204 
Total implemented FDI 2,375 2,537 2,420 2,450 2,591  2,650 2,850 
Share of clothing in total implemented FDI 3.5% 3.8% 4.2% 5.8% 7.6% 6.6% 7.2%













Registered FDI 0.3 1.7 0.6 18.9 1.7 0.2 233.7 524.8 144.7 274.0 125.1 135.6 79.6 122.1 159.5 81.3 47.1
Implemented FDI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.1 132.6 89.0 53.4 61.9 92.7 61.3 131.8 162.4
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Table 4:  U.S. FDI by Economic Sector (1988 through Dec. 31, 2004 – US$ millions) 
 
















I Industry and construction 176 1751 2208 12637 149 822 519 6281
1 Heavy industry 92 648 385 3073 80 487 234 2085
2 Food processing 19 557 693 2566 16 67 9 283
3 Oil and gas 8 219 864 1430 6 124 232 780
4 Construction 15 196 146 1530 11 82 26 214
5 Light industry 42 131 120 4038 36 63 19 2919
II Agriculture-Forestry and 
Fisheries
26 198 87 873 24 153 62 863
6 Agriculture and Forestry 24 187 82 770 22 142 58 760
7 Fisheries 2 12 4 103 2 12 4 103
III Services 65 653 339 3343 42 316 149 1297
8 Hotel and tourism 13 267 72 785 5 73 3
9 Culture, healthcare, education 12 136 35 1007 11 86 34 1003
10 Banking and finance 10 11 103 915 4 65 37 0
11 Transportation, communications 
and postage
12 67 60 289 10 44 46 163
12 Apartments and buildings 2 37 41 37 1 16 8
13 Others 15 33 25 310 10 27 19 124
14 EPZ and IP development 1 5 3 0 1 5 3
Total 267 2602 2634 16853 215 1291 730 8441





ported FDI - IIU.S.-Related FDI - I
Understatement (I-II)  
 
Source: MPI. Initial registered capital reported in this table is registered capital at the time of 
establishment, which does not include subsequent capital changes. Implemented FDI is for active 
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Table 5:  Growth Rate and Share of U.S.-Related Implemented FDI (US$ millions) 
 
  U.S.-Related FDI  Reported U.S. FDI  Overall  FDI 








FDI  Growth 
rate 
1996 220   8% 75   3% 2923   
1997 266 21% 8% 133 77% 4% 3218 10%
1998 271 2% 11% 89 -33% 4% 2375 -26%
1999 274 1% 11% 53 -40% 2% 2537 7%
2000 196 -28% 8% 62 17% 3% 2420 -5%
2001 258 31% 11% 93 50% 4% 2430 0%
Pre-BTA 
geometric means  
3.2%     4.3%     -3.6%
2002 169 -35% 7% 61 -34% 2% 2591 7%
2003 449 166% 17% 132 116% 5% 2651 2%
2004 531 18% 19% 162 23% 6% 2850 8%
Post-BTA 
geometric means  
27.3%     20.5%     5.5%
Source: MPI. The FDI data in this figure are not adjusted for dissolved and expired projects. This 
is why cumulative reported implemented FDI in this table exceeds cumulative registered 
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Source: MPI. The U.S. trend line is for U.S.-related implemented FDI. Other countries’ trend 
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Table 6:  Implemented FDI by Country from 2000 to 2004 (US$ millions) 
 
No. Countries  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1 U.S.-Related 196 258 169 449 531
2 Holland 79 339 403 350 483
3  Korea  142 125 154 203 421
4  Japan 454 367 411 515 350
5  Singapore 294 235 221 300 328
6 Taiwan 361 269 208 298 235
7 France 76 137 109 169 152
8 Hong Kong  195 87 118 76 145
9 Thailand  35 54 77 67 76
10 Mauritius  45 85 39 94 62
11 China 26 27 49 31 51
12 Russia 216 169 175 74 46
13 Cayman Islands 18 30 40 39 46
14 BVI 123 108 113 46 45
15 Australia 24 14 24 30 41
 Others 265 311 390 226 206
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Table 7:  Resident Country for FDI from U.S. Overseas Subsidiaries (1988 through 
Dec. 31, 2004, US$ millions)  
 
No.  
Resident country for U.S. 
overseas subsidiaries with FDI 
to Vietnam 
No. of 
projects  Registered FDI  
Implemented 
FDI  
1 Singapore  13 562 806
2 Holland 4 175 115
3 Hong Kong  8 138 109
4 British Virgin Islands  7 74 23
5 Bermuda  3 69 157
6 Mauritius  1 65 618
7 Switzerland 2 60 1
8 Cook Islands  1 50 0
9 Cayman Islands  1 37 41
10 United Kingdom 2 31 15
11 Ukraine  1 16 12
12 Taiwan 4 12 8
15 Japan 1 0.5 0.0
 All other  1 9.7 1.8






Table 8:  U.S. Investment by Form (1988 through Dec. 31, 2004 – US$ millions) 
 















( )1  100% foreign owned companies 192 1636 1104 10253 159 853 267 5811
2 JVs 59 732 662 5080 42 300 229 1760
3 BCCs 16 234 867 1520 14 139 235 870
Total 267 2602 2634 16853 215 1291 730 8441
52 1310 1904 8412
U.S.-Reported FDI - IIU.S.-Related FDI - I
Understatement (I-II)  
 
Source: MPI. Registered capital reported in this table is initial registered capital at the time of 
establishment, which does not include subsequent capital changes. Implemented FDI is for active 
projects, which excludes dissolved and expired projects. 
 
 
  
